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Identity

Attackers enroll their own passkeys to keep access

Passkeys stop sign-in phishing, so attackers hit enrollment and recovery instead. How the Okta vishing kit works and how to lock down Entra registration.

Passkeys were supposed to end credential phishing, and at the sign-in step they mostly do. A passkey is a public and private key pair bound to a device, built on the FIDO2 and WebAuthn standards (Fast Identity Online 2 and Web Authentication). The private key never leaves the authenticator, and every login is tied to the real website's address, so a fake page or a relay proxy cannot reuse it. Attackers have responded by moving one step earlier, to the moment a new authenticator is enrolled and to the account-recovery flow that stands in for it.

If your organization is rolling out passkeys on Microsoft 365, Okta, or any identity provider, this affects you now. Okta Threat Intelligence published a live campaign on July 5, 2026 in which a caller walks an employee through a fake passkey setup while the attacker registers a passkey of their own on the real account. BleepingComputer and Help Net Security reported the same campaign. The registered authenticator belongs to the attacker, and a password reset does not remove it.

How it works

A passkey login resists phishing because of how WebAuthn signs the challenge. The browser signs the server's random challenge with the private key and binds that signature to the origin, meaning the exact domain the user is on. A lookalike site, or an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) proxy that sits between the user and the real server, lives on a different domain, so the signature it collects is scoped to the wrong origin and the real server rejects it. There is nothing phishable to replay. That is the property that makes passkeys strong at sign-in.

Enrollment has no such property. Registering a new passkey, security key, or other authentication method is usually gated only by the factors the account already has: a password and a single multi-factor authentication (MFA) code. Neither of those is bound to an origin. A password can be typed into a fake page, and a one-time passcode or push approval can be captured in real time and replayed within its short validity window. So an attacker who collects both can sign in to the genuine service and then enroll an authenticator they control. The account ends up with a brand new phishing-resistant credential, except it is the attacker's.

The recovery path has the same weakness. Help-desk account recovery often re-establishes access from a password reset plus an identity check a caller can talk their way through. Once the attacker owns an enrolled authenticator, resetting the password changes only one factor. The authenticator is a separate object on the account and stays registered until someone removes it by hand. That is the durable backdoor: the victim regains their password and believes the incident is over, while the attacker still holds a working strong credential.

What attackers are doing

Okta tracks the main campaign as O-UNC-066, operating a data-leak site called Pink, and Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 tracks the same activity as CL-CRI-1147. It has run since April 2026, with infrastructure registered between April 21 and June 14, aimed at data extortion across food and beverage, technology, healthcare, automotive, construction, and aviation firms. The lure is a phone call (voice phishing, or vishing) telling the employee they need to register a new passkey, which sends them to a per-target lookalike domain carrying the employer's branding.

The kit is not a transparent AiTM proxy. Okta describes an operator-controlled PHP panel with a one-second heartbeat, so a live person steers the victim page by page. The victim's username and password post to the panel, and Okta assesses the operator signs in to the real account within seconds. A loading screen holds the victim while the operator sees which MFA challenge Microsoft presents, then shows the matching page: an SMS code, an authenticator code, or a push with number matching where the victim types a number the operator supplies. The "create a passkey" screens register nothing on the victim's device. Okta calls them a distraction while the attacker enrolls their own passkey with Microsoft, backed by a fake twelve-word recovery phrase to keep the victim busy. The one real signal the victim gets is Microsoft's own email about a new passkey, which the attacker names in a harmless way. Okta notes it did not directly observe compromise of Microsoft accounts, so the passkey-registration goal is an inference from the kit's design; the follow-on reporting records data theft from SharePoint and OneDrive after access.

Microsoft has documented the same shape of attack through the help desk. Its reporting on Octo Tempest describes callers who socially engineer a service desk into resetting a password and adding or changing an MFA factor, including a case where a privileged user's MFA device was removed and the password reset through self-service recovery. One thing made the lure easier: in May 2026 Microsoft gave administrators passkey registration campaigns that prompt users to enroll at sign-in, so a prompt to "set up your passkey" now looks routine.

What to do

  1. Require an existing phishing-resistant factor to enroll a new one. Do not let a password plus a single one-time code reach the registration screen. In Microsoft Entra ID, create a Conditional Access policy targeting the Register security information user action and grant it only with an authentication strength that lists phishing-resistant methods (passkey or FIDO2 security key, Windows Hello for Business, certificate-based authentication). For the genuine first-time enrollment where a user has no strong factor yet, hand out a Temporary Access Pass through a known channel rather than allowing bootstrap from a password alone.
  2. Gate registration by context as well as factor. Add trusted-location or compliant-device conditions to the same policy so security-info changes only succeed from managed devices or known networks. Keep Entra's default that a user who already has an MFA method must re-authenticate before viewing or changing their security info.
  3. Monitor the identity audit log for new authenticators. In Entra, alert on the activity names "User registered security info", "User registered all required security info", and "User changed default security info" (logged by the Azure MFA service), and treat any addition that lands soon after a password reset, or from a new device or location, as suspect. Match the registered method against the user's FIDO2 authentication methods to confirm a passkey or security key was added. In Okta, constrain who can add or modify authenticators by network and device state, and notify users of every authenticator lifecycle event.
  4. After any suspected compromise, do not rely on a password reset. Enumerate and remove unknown authenticators, revoke active sessions, and re-baseline the account's registered methods. Check for the attacker's follow-on access to SharePoint and OneDrive, and for new inbox rules or app consents.
  5. Harden the help desk and the people. Verify a caller's identity out of band before any password or MFA change, and issue any legitimate replacement passkey through an admin channel, never from an inbound call. Tell staff the plain rule: a phone call that walks you through setting up a passkey is an attack.

The lesson of passwordless

Going passwordless moves the weak point rather than removing it. Sign-in is now the hard part to attack, so the pressure lands on everything around it: enrollment, recovery, and the human who approves both. Secure the whole credential lifecycle, from who may add a factor to how a lost one is restored, and give a new authenticator the same scrutiny you would give a new admin account.

If you are rolling out passkeys and want the registration and recovery paths tested before an attacker finds them, that work sits inside our safeguarding and hardening service, and the audit-log alerting it needs is part of security operations. Open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to the engineer who would do the work.


Sources: Okta Threat Intelligence, Help Net Security, Security Boulevard, Paubox, Microsoft on Octo Tempest, Microsoft Entra authentication strengths, Microsoft Entra phishing-resistant MFA policy.

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