Threat intel
A 13.3 million record breach, and what its penalty teaches
Four US states settled with medical transcriber PJ&A over a breach of 13.3 million records. The root causes are controls any team can check this week.
Perry Johnson and Associates (PJ&A), a medical transcription company, has settled with four US state attorneys general over a 2023 breach that exposed records tied to more than 13.3 million people. New York, which led the coalition with Connecticut, Michigan and New Jersey, announced the agreement on November 6, 2026. The headline figure is up to 10 million US dollars, but only about 300,000 dollars is payable now; the other 9.7 million is suspended and comes due only if the companies fail to meet the agreement's terms. The money goes to the states, not to patients, whose own claims continue in a separate federal case.
The breach itself is old, so the value for a defender is in the cause rather than fresh indicators to block. State investigators laid out exactly how the attackers got in and why nobody noticed for about two months, and every failure they named maps to a control you can check this week. There was no clever exploit here. A login with no second factor let the attackers in, and security software that wrote everything down and told no one let them stay.
What happened and what it cost
In March 2023, attackers reached PJ&A's systems using the login credentials of a PJ&A Coding employee. Over the following weeks they harvested more passwords, many of them nearly identical and circulated by email, and read files that were stored without encryption. The data pulled from medical transcription records was the kind that cannot be reissued: names, dates of birth, home addresses, Social Security numbers, medical record and hospital account numbers, insurance details, admission diagnoses, dates of treatment, test results, medications and the providers who gave them.
PJ&A first reported the breach to the US Department of Health and Human Services as affecting almost 9 million people. That count climbed to more than 13.3 million as the picture filled in, including about 4.2 million New York residents, and the states note the real total could be higher because the attackers also reached shared network storage the companies never fully reviewed. Several of PJ&A's hospital and health system clients filed their own breach reports on top of the company's.
The settlement is a penalty paid to states, framed as an assurance of discontinuance, not compensation to the people whose records leaked. New York's share of the upfront money is at least 100,000 dollars. Alongside the payment, the companies must run a written information security program, keep an incident response plan, deploy multi-factor authentication (MFA, a second proof of identity beyond a password), manage passwords properly, encrypt sensitive data, track their assets, and carry out annual risk assessments in line with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the US law that governs protected health information (PHI).
How the attackers got in and why it went undetected
Four failures did the damage, and each one is ordinary.
First, the way in was a legitimate employee's stolen credentials. That means no exploit, no malware on the perimeter, just a valid username and password used by the wrong person. Second, the remote access path that accepted those credentials did not require MFA. A stolen password was a complete key, because nothing else stood behind it.
Third, and the detail worth sitting with: the company's security software detected the intruder's activity and recorded it, but it was not configured to send alerts to anyone. The evidence existed the whole time. No human was ever told to look at it. Fourth, and as a direct result, PJ&A did not discover the breach through its own monitoring. It found out on May 2, 2023, when the attackers made contact and demanded payment, roughly two months after they first got in. The company began telling its clients in July 2023, and affected individuals were notified between October 31, 2023 and February 8, 2024, a gap the New York attorney general called an unreasonable delay.
What to do
Map each of those failures to a control and check it against your own environment. None of this is new technology; it is configuration and discipline.
Require phishing-resistant MFA on every remote access path, not some of them. That means the VPN (virtual private network), Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP, Windows remote access), webmail, and every admin and cloud portal. Prefer FIDO2 security keys or passkeys over one-time codes and push prompts, which attackers phish and fatigue. One path left without a second factor is the path they will use.
Make security tooling alert, not just log. Decide which events must page a human: a login from a new country, a bulk file read, a new admin, a disabled security agent. Route those alerts to a queue someone watches, and test them by generating the event and confirming the alert arrives. Software that writes to a log nobody reads is what PJ&A had.
Detect credential misuse specifically. Build alerts for impossible travel (one account signing in from two distant places too fast to be real), sign-ins from new devices, and bulk access to records far above a user's normal pattern. A stolen but valid credential looks like a normal login until you watch for the behaviour around it.
Have a breach-detection and notification plan so you find out before the attacker tells you. Write down who declares an incident, who is called, and the legal notification clock for your jurisdiction and for HIPAA. Rehearse it. PJ&A learned of its breach from the people who committed it, then took months to notify the public.
If you outsource data to a vendor, such as a transcription, billing or analytics provider, that vendor's weak control becomes your breach. Do security due diligence before you send them PHI, write concrete requirements into the contract (MFA, encryption at rest, breach notification within a fixed number of hours, a right to audit), and confirm the business associate agreement HIPAA requires is actually in place. The states specifically faulted missing agreements between the affiliated PJ&A entities.
Why this keeps happening
A valid credential, no second factor behind it, and monitoring that only records is a combination sitting in a lot of networks right now, in healthcare and well beyond it. The attackers here did nothing exotic. They signed in, read files for two months, and announced themselves when they were ready. Every control that would have changed the outcome is listed above, and each costs far less than notifying 13.3 million people and defending a multistate investigation.
For anyone sending patient data to an outside vendor, the lesson lands twice. The breach was at PJ&A, but the records belonged to the hospitals and health systems that hired it, and several of them had to file their own breach notices. A vendor's missing MFA and silent alerts become your incident the moment you hand over the data.
If you want a second set of eyes on where credentials can reach your systems and whether your alerts actually fire, that is the work in our security operations and compliance and audit readiness services. Open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to the engineer who would do the work.
Sources: New York Attorney General press release, NY assurance of discontinuance (PDF), Cybernews, Malwarebytes, GovInfoSecurity, HIPAA Journal.