Threat intel
Blank key in a ScreenConnect add-on spreads SCKit
RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension, accepted a blank access key, letting attackers bypass login and push the self-spreading SCKit backdoor to 288 hosts.
On November 11, 2026, Huntress reported that attackers abused RMM+, a third-party extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect, to skip authentication and push a self-spreading backdoor called SCKit onto managed machines. RMM (remote monitoring and management) tools like ScreenConnect let an IT provider reach and control customer computers remotely. In RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 the extension's shared access key defaulted to blank when an administrator never set one, and the check accepted an empty value, so a request with no key was treated as authorised. The activity reached 288 hosts across 48 organizations, all within about 90 minutes, and roughly a third of them in the first ten.
Anyone running on-premises ScreenConnect with an RMM+ family extension installed is in scope, and so is every customer of a managed service provider (MSP) whose ScreenConnect panel was reached this way. RMM+ authenticates with its own key instead of going through ScreenConnect's user accounts, roles and multi-factor authentication (MFA), so the blank default handed an attacker the reach of a technician: one provider panel can drive hundreds of customer machines. ConnectWise says it found no compromise of its own infrastructure and no flaw in ScreenConnect itself, and no CVE identifier was assigned to the extension's blank-key behaviour.
How it works
ScreenConnect is the remote-support product many IT providers use to connect to customer machines, and extensions add features on top of it. RMM+ adds automation driven through an application programming interface (API), the way one program talks to another. Rather than reuse ScreenConnect's own logins, roles and MFA, RMM+ checks API calls against a single shared access key that the administrator is meant to configure.
The flaw is that configuration step. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, an administrator who never set a key left the stored key empty, and the comparison then accepted an empty submitted value. An unauthenticated request carrying a blank key was treated as valid, which bypassed the login ScreenConnect would normally require. The telling detail for defenders is where the trace landed: Huntress saw the commands in RMM+ logs with no matching entry in ScreenConnect's own login logs, so a team watching only the login logs would see nothing.
The reason a backdoor like this spreads from provider to customer is the shape of the tool. A single ScreenConnect panel at an MSP manages every endpoint that MSP supports, so one accepted request can push commands to all of them at once, which is how 288 machines fell inside 90 minutes. SCKit then installs a rogue ScreenConnect client alongside the real one and is built to climb the other way. It waits for a technician to connect to an infected endpoint, then tries to infect that technician's own workstation and the other sessions the technician can reach. Succeeding would turn one compromised customer into a route back into the provider and out to its other customers. Huntress says it has not yet seen that spread work, and attempts to reuse stolen session data failed in every host log the team checked.
What attackers are doing
Huntress first saw the activity at about 17:47 UTC on November 11 and watched it work through several MSP cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels. No group has been named. SCKit itself is a package of about 16 files, a mix of PowerShell, batch and configuration scripts, that sets up persistent remote access rather than a single payload.
On an infected host it holds on through a scheduled task named TrapWatch, a working folder at C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ and a Run registry key named RelayTrapLiteAlert, and it adds Microsoft Defender exclusions so its files are skipped by scans. Part of the toolkit steals the technician's ScreenConnect session cookie, the .aspxauth value, to replay it against the management panel and take over the console. That console takeover did not succeed in the logs Huntress recovered, but the capability is built in, so treat a touched host as one where cookies and sessions are no longer trustworthy.
This follows worm-like ScreenConnect abuse that Huntress has tracked since September 2026, around the time ConnectWise fixed CVE-2026-84869, a file-transfer flaw rated 9.9 on the CVSS severity scale. The pattern is the same: reach a trusted remote-support channel, then ride the connections it already has.
What to do
1. Disable the RMM+ family extensions
In on-premises ScreenConnect, disable the five extensions in this family: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. Disabling them stops further abuse of the blank key, but it does not evict an attacker already inside, so pair it with the checks below.
2. Confirm the cloud and partner-hosted action
ConnectWise disabled the same five extensions across about 400 ScreenConnect environments it hosts. If your ScreenConnect is cloud or partner-hosted, confirm that action covered your instance rather than assume it, and ask your provider whether their panel was among those reached.
3. Review whether RMM+ is still needed
If you keep RMM+, set a non-blank access key and move off 1.0.31 and 1.0.32. Given how this played out, the safer choice for most estates is to remove extensions that are not actively used, so an add-on that sits outside ScreenConnect's own MFA is not left authenticating your automation on a default.
4. Check RMM+ logs, not only login logs
Because the commands appeared in RMM+ logs with no matching ScreenConnect login, read the RMM+ logs directly. In ScreenConnect, review the Run Command and Toolbox history for commands no technician ran, especially a burst around November 11. Huntress and ConnectWise both published indicators of compromise (IoCs); pull those lists and search against them.
5. Hunt the host artefacts
On endpoints, look for a second ScreenConnect client you did not deploy running beside the legitimate one, the C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ folder, the TrapWatch scheduled task, the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run key and any new Defender exclusions nobody requested. Any of these alongside the command-history findings points to SCKit.
6. If you were hit
Isolate the host, then remove the rogue client and the SCKit persistence together. Rotate ScreenConnect administrator and technician passwords and the RMM+ access key, and force every technician to re-authenticate so stolen .aspxauth cookies stop working. Work out which commands ran on which endpoints from the history, and rebuild any machine where SCKit persistence or unknown binaries remain rather than clean in place.
The wider lesson
A third-party extension that authenticates with its own shared key sits outside the product's MFA and role controls, so a weak or blank default in the add-on is the same as leaving the console itself open. Keep an inventory of the extensions installed on any tool that can reach your whole estate, and check how each one authenticates, not only that the main product has MFA turned on.
Our security operations team hunts for unapproved remote access and the persistence SCKit leaves behind, and our safeguarding and hardening work reviews the extensions and defaults on tools like ScreenConnect before they become the way in. Open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to the engineer who would do the work.
Sources: Huntress, CyberScoop, SecurityWeek.