Threat intel
Turla's Cereal malware turns Exchange into a spy hub
Russia-linked APT Turla hides its Cereal toolset inside government Exchange servers to steal NATO and EU email. How it works and how to find it.
ESET has documented a Turla espionage toolset it calls Cereal, built to sit inside a government's own Microsoft Exchange server and copy the email that passes through it. Turla is a long-running advanced persistent threat (APT) group, an attacker that fixes on a chosen organisation and stays hidden for months or years, and it is widely assessed to be part of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). ESET attributes Cereal to Turla with high confidence and published its analysis on 10 November 2026.
If you run on-premises Exchange for a government body, or for anyone Turla takes an interest in, the awkward part is how little there is to see. Cereal does not register a new transport agent, so the usual configuration listing looks clean. It does not call out to an attacker's server either, so there is no outbound connection to catch. ESET found no external command-and-control (C2) infrastructure at all. The compromised Exchange server is the control point: operators send it commands as web requests dressed up to look like normal Exchange traffic.
How it works
Exchange processes mail through transport agents, small plug-ins that inspect or change every message as it moves along the transport pipeline. Anti-spam and journaling run this way. The pipeline lives in a process called EdgeTransport.exe, which handles mail flow on the server. A legitimate agent is registered in Exchange's configuration and shows up when an administrator lists what is installed.
The CerealBox component skips registration entirely. It injects straight into EdgeTransport.exe, finds the transport agents already loaded in memory, and wraps their handlers so its own code runs first and then hands control back to the real agent. Mail keeps flowing, nothing new appears in the agent list, and the collection logic reads every message from inside the process meant to move it. ESET says hooking the transport service from the inside this way had not been documented for any malware family before.
CerealBox keeps only what the operators want. It selects messages with a .doc, .docx or .pdf attachment whose sender, recipient, subject or attachment name matches hardcoded lists, while skipping an ignore list. Matches are compressed, encrypted and left staged on disk for collection. In the Romanian victim the lists were set to catch mail to or from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) institutional addresses.
The second half is CerealNeuron, the main backdoor. It is passive. It waits for inbound web requests on paths that look like ordinary Exchange URLs, such as /owa/sdds/ and /autodiscover/proxyservice/. A request carrying the right encryption that passes an integrity check is decrypted and run; anything else gets a normal-looking Exchange error page. The commands themselves are small compiled .NET programs that pull whole mailboxes, query Active Directory (the Windows directory service, AD), extract Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, and read or delete files. A sister component, CerealHermit, does the same job with no network at all, reading encrypted command files from disk as a fallback.
What attackers are doing
ESET first found Cereal on a government organisation in Kazakhstan on 28 November 2025. Activity there jumped on 15 January 2026, the day after the Old New Year, a holiday still kept in Russia and nearby countries. After tuning its detections, ESET spotted a second government victim in Romania that had been compromised on 23 December 2025, roughly a month after the Kazakhstan find.
Both victims were government Exchange servers, which fits Turla's history of going after foreign ministries and state bodies for diplomatic intelligence. The Romanian setup, aimed at NATO and EU correspondence, shows operators reading for specific political traffic rather than scooping up everything. One point worth keeping straight: collecting a government's mail to NATO and EU addresses does not mean NATO or EU systems were touched.
The loader that starts the chain was disguised as trusted-looking Windows files. ESET saw it posing as ncobjapi.dll inside C:\Windows\System32\wbem and as wbemcomn.dll, with further copies dropped into the .NET native image cache under names like Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll. ESET could not identify the addresses the operators connected from.
What to do
Start with a transport-agent inventory. In the Exchange Management Shell, run Get-TransportAgent and compare each entry against a known-good baseline for your Exchange version and your own add-ons. Do it, but know its limit here: CerealBox never registers an agent, so a clean list does not clear you. It still earns its place, because other Exchange implants, including Turla's older ones, do register agents.
The detection that matters for Cereal is what EdgeTransport.exe has loaded. Enumerate the modules (DLLs, the dynamic link library files Windows maps into a running process) inside EdgeTransport.exe and flag any that are unsigned, sit in an unexpected path, or do not belong to Exchange. Treat the disguised names ESET listed as direct indicators: ncobjapi.dll or wbemcomn.dll loaded from the wbem folder, and Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll-style files in the native image cache. On the network side, read your Exchange web logs for requests to odd paths such as /owa/sdds/ that return errors, since that is how the backdoor is addressed. Pull the full indicator set from ESET's GitHub repository and hunt back through stored logs, not just live traffic.
Keep Exchange current on its cumulative and security updates. If you run a version that no longer receives them, plan the move to a supported platform now, because an unpatched internet-facing Exchange server is how many of these intrusions begin.
If you find Cereal, treat the server and everything it could reach as compromised. The backdoor ran commands that dumped LSA secrets and queried Active Directory, so credential theft has already happened. Rebuild the Exchange server from known-good media instead of deleting files in place. Rotate the server's machine account password and every service and administrative credential used on or stored by it, reset the Active Directory krbtgt account password twice to invalidate forged Kerberos tickets, and work out which mailboxes and directory data the operators reached so the affected people can be told.
A quieter kind of persistence
Turla has been abusing Exchange like this for more than a decade. ESET's LightNeuron, documented in 2019 and active since at least 2014, was the first known backdoor to persist through a malicious Exchange transport agent. That agent was registered in the configuration, where a careful administrator could find it. Cereal is the same idea with the registration removed. A configuration inventory will not show it. Catching an implant like this means seeing the code actually running inside the Exchange processes, not only the list of what is supposed to be there.
Our security operations team hunts for this kind of in-memory tampering, where nothing new is registered and nothing beacons out, and our safeguarding and hardening work cuts down the exposure that lets an attacker reach a mail server at all. Open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to the engineer who would do the work.
Sources: ESET WeLiveSecurity: Exchange for breakfast, Turla's Cereal tricks are not for kids, Help Net Security, Security Affairs, GovInfoSecurity, ESET WeLiveSecurity: Turla LightNeuron (2019).