Yaamlabs
Threat intel

Baker Tilly: client data taken from a vendor platform

Baker Tilly is notifying adults and minors after names, addresses and Social Security numbers were taken from a third-party provider's platform.

By Yaali. November 16, 2026, 7 min read, Threat intel, Resilience.

Cover illustration of client records moving through an outside file-exchange portal, with the Yaamlabs logo and the text: Client data taken from a vendor, not the firm, Adults plus minors, names, addresses, SSNs exposed

Baker Tilly Advisory Group, one of the largest accounting and advisory firms in the United States, has begun notifying people that their personal information was taken in a data breach. The data was not sitting on Baker Tilly's own network. It was held on a platform run by a third-party service provider that the firm uses to carry out client work, and an unauthorised actor reached it there. The information involved includes names, home addresses and Social Security numbers (SSNs), the nine-digit identifiers tied to US tax, credit and benefits records.

According to reporting on the breach, both adults and minors were among those affected. That detail matters, because a stolen child SSN can be abused for years before anyone checks a credit file that should not exist yet. Baker Tilly dated its notification letters 9 November 2026 and reported the breach to state regulators, including the Texas Attorney General's office, in the days that followed. If you receive one of those letters, the sections below cover how the exposure happened, which dates and data are confirmed, and the steps that actually reduce the risk, including the separate steps a parent should take for a child.

Timeline of the Baker Tilly third-party breach: access on 2 September, discovery on 6 September, review completed 28 October, notices mailed 9 November, regulators notified 10 November 2026

How it happened: a breach on someone else's platform

Professional-services firms run on other people's data. To prepare tax filings, run audits or advise on a transaction, a firm collects names, addresses, SSNs and financial records for its clients and, often, for those clients' employees or dependants. Much of that work no longer happens on the firm's own servers. Files move to an external platform: a software-as-a-service (SaaS) application, a managed file-exchange portal or a vendor-hosted workspace.

That is where this breach sits. Baker Tilly's own notice says the incident involved information stored on a platform operated by a third-party service provider used in connection with the services it provides to clients, and that the unauthorised actor obtained data relating to certain Baker Tilly clients. The firm also states it has found no evidence of continued unauthorised access to its own network or systems.

The pattern behind this kind of incident is a familiar one. An attacker reaches the data through the provider rather than through the firm. That happens when the platform is misconfigured and left reachable, when credentials for it are stolen or reused, or when the provider's own software has a flaw. The firm's network is never the entry point, so its own monitoring may see nothing. The duty to notify, though, follows the data and the relationship, not the server. Baker Tilly collected the information and chose the platform, so Baker Tilly owns the notification, even for people who have never dealt with the firm directly.

The timeline and what was taken

The dates are close together at the start and then stretch out. The unauthorised access is reported to have occurred on 2 September 2026. Baker Tilly became aware of a potential incident on 6 September 2026, four days later, and began an investigation with outside experts. It completed its review of the affected data on 28 October 2026, the point at which it could say whose information was involved and what was exposed. Notification letters are dated 9 November 2026, and the filing with the Texas Attorney General's office followed on 10 November 2026.

The gap from 28 October to 9 November is the stretch worth noting. Even after the review was done, it took another twelve days to confirm addresses and mail the letters, time in which affected people could not act because they did not yet know. That lag is normal for breach notifications, which is why the letter is the start of your response, not proof that the risk only just began.

On scope, the confirmed data types are names, addresses and SSNs, plus other personal information that varied from one person to the next. Baker Tilly has not published an overall total. The Texas filing lists 10,456 Texas residents, and a separate state filing lists 111 Rhode Island residents, so the full count across all states is higher than any single figure reported so far. The firm is offering affected people two years of credit and identity monitoring through Experian at no cost.

Prioritised actions after the Baker Tilly breach, split into steps for affected individuals including parents of minors, and steps for organisations reducing third-party exposure

What to do

If you are notified, including parents of minors

Place a credit freeze with all three US credit bureaus, Equifax, Experian and TransUnion. A freeze is free, stops most lenders from opening new accounts in your name, and does not affect your existing accounts or credit score. It is the single most effective step against SSN misuse, and a monitoring service is not a substitute for it, because monitoring tells you after a new account appears rather than preventing it.

If a child's information was in your letter, freeze the child's credit separately. A minor normally has no credit file, so you contact each of the three bureaus to create and then freeze one, which blocks anyone from opening accounts against the child's SSN. Do this even though the child will not apply for credit for years, because that long gap is exactly what makes a child's SSN valuable to a thief.

Enrol in the offered Experian monitoring, then watch for the specific fraud that follows an SSN leak: a tax return filed in your name before you file your own, benefits claimed that you did not request, and new-account or collections notices for accounts you never opened. Be wary of messages about the breach. Attackers send breach-themed phishing and fake settlement offers that copy a real notice, so do not click links or pay anything, and reach official channels through addresses you look up yourself.

If you are an organisation

Start with an inventory of which third parties hold your SSNs and any minors' data, because you cannot protect or notify on data you cannot locate. For each one, require encryption in transit and at rest, least-privilege access so the provider and its staff see only what they must, a breach-notification deadline written into the contract, and the right to audit the provider's controls rather than take them on trust.

Reduce the data itself. Collect SSNs only where a law or a filing truly requires them, delete them when the engagement ends, and replace stored SSNs with tokens where a system only needs to match records rather than read the number. Finally, write a notification playbook in advance, with who decides, who drafts and who mails, so the review-to-notice stretch does not drag longer than it has to.

How to check whether you were notified

Watch your physical mail, since these notices go out by US post, not email. A genuine Baker Tilly letter is dated 9 November 2026 or later, describes the third-party platform incident, and includes an engagement reference for questions. Treat any email or text claiming to be the breach as suspect until you confirm it independently, and never enter personal details into a link from such a message. You do not need to wait for a letter to act: a credit freeze is worth placing now whether or not you were in this particular breach, and it costs nothing to put on or lift.

The responsibility for the data does not move to the vendor along with the work. When a firm puts client data on an outside platform, its clients inherit that provider's security, and the firm still answers for the fallout.

Knowing which outside platforms hold your most sensitive data, and confirming how well they are locked down, is the starting point for our attack surface management work, and the contract terms and evidence around those vendors are what we help teams put in place for compliance and audit readiness. Open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to the engineer who would do the work.


Sources: ClassAction.org on the Baker Tilly breach, Baker Tilly sample notification letter (PDF), ClaimDepot on the Baker Tilly breach, Texas Attorney General data breach reports.

Read next

Back to the blog, or tell us about your system in the chat. Yaali, our AI agent, answers first and brings in an engineer.