Payout flow accepted replayed webhooks
Marketplace, Web & API penetration test, HIGH
The payout flow trusted a webhook. The webhook could be sent twice.
Anonymized write-ups from real engagements. The finding, the reasoning that found it, and what changed after.
Marketplace, Web & API penetration test, HIGH
The payout flow trusted a webhook. The webhook could be sent twice.
Consumer internet, Web & API penetration test, CRITICAL
A dating platform let members share photos privately with matches. We were asked whether a private photo could be reached by someone it was never shared with, and whether profiles could be collected in bulk.
Web3, Web & API penetration test, CRITICAL
A decentralised exchange asked us to test the web layer around its contracts. Their concern was precise: the smart contracts were audited, but the interface users actually trust to build a transaction was not.
Web3, Smart contract audit, HIGH
A token distribution proved who was eligible with a compact cryptographic proof against a published root. We were asked whether the proof could be satisfied by someone who was never on the list.
AI, LLM red team, CRITICAL
A support agent read customer messages and could issue refunds. Those two facts were connected by nothing but the model’s judgement.
Consumer internet, Web & API penetration test, CRITICAL
A consumer platform let people sign in with a third-party account and message each other privately. We were asked whether the linked login could be turned against the account, and whether private messages stayed private.
Web3, Smart contract audit, CRITICAL
A lending protocol was launching a governance token with a holding-reward feature that granted a multiplier for longer-held balances. We were asked to find a way to manipulate the reward logic before it went live with real liquidity.
E-commerce, Web & API penetration test, HIGH
A marketplace connected buyers with independent merchants and paid merchants on a schedule. We were asked whether a discount could be made to apply where it should not, and whether a payout could be pointed at the wrong account.
SaaS, Cloud & CI/CD review, HIGH
A pull request from a fork could run the pipeline. The pipeline held a token that could write to production.
Nonprofit, Web & API penetration test, HIGH
A donation platform took one-off and recurring gifts and let donors manage their details. We were asked whether a session could outlive its owner, and whether card data was handled the way donors would expect.
Legal services, Web & API penetration test, HIGH
A legal practice platform organised documents by matter, each belonging to a client. We were asked whether a user on one matter could reach documents filed under another.
Wealth management, Red team & code review, CRITICAL
A wealth management firm wanted to know how its defences held against a patient, targeted adversary rather than a checklist. The objective was set narrowly: reach the client portfolio data, quietly, and show the path.
Government contracting, Web & API penetration test, HIGH
A supplier portal let organisations download documents and reset their own passwords. We were asked whether a document could be pulled by the wrong organisation, and whether a reset link could be anticipated.
Healthcare, Internal network review, HIGH
An HL7 interface from a previous decade was still running. It was supposed to be isolated. From the clinical VLAN, it answered.
Content management, Web application penetration test, HIGH
A public marketing site ran on a common content platform with third-party plugins. We were asked whether the site could be used as a way onto the server behind it.
Cloud SaaS, Cloud & Kubernetes security, CRITICAL
A company running entirely in the cloud asked us to assume the worst realistic starting point: one developer workstation compromised, and nothing else. The question was how far that single machine reached.
Media and advertising, Web & API penetration test, HIGH
An agency platform hosted campaign assets before launch and let clients comment on them. We were asked whether an asset could be read by the wrong client, and whether a comment could carry more than text.
DeFi, Smart contract audit, CRITICAL
A staking contract paid rewards proportionally. The arithmetic was correct in every individual case and wrong in aggregate.
Enterprise IT, Internal network penetration test, CRITICAL
An internal test started from an ordinary desk network port, with no account. We were asked how far a visitor with a network cable could reach.
Crypto exchange, Web & API penetration test, CRITICAL
An exchange let customers withdraw balances to external addresses. We were asked whether the balance check and the payout could be made to disagree, and whether an operator surface was reachable without one.
Financial services, Network penetration test, CRITICAL
A large financial enterprise asked us to assess its internal network from a standard low-privilege starting point: a single ordinary account, no special access, the position an attacker reaches after one foothold.
Booking and marketplace, Web & API penetration test, HIGH
A booking platform sold access to premium workspace by the hour. We were asked whether the price a member paid was the price the server set, or the price the browser sent.
Banking, Web & API penetration test, CRITICAL
A digital bank asked us to test the customer application and the APIs behind it. One endpoint served account statements. It checked that the caller was logged in. It never checked that the statement belonged to them.
Insurance, Web & API penetration test, CRITICAL
A claims portal let policyholders file and track claims. We were asked whether one policyholder could reach another's records, and whether the approval step could be reached from the wrong side.
Enterprise software, Web & API penetration test, CRITICAL
A managed file transfer product moved contracts, records and financial documents between large organisations. We were asked to test whether the download path could be made to serve a file the caller had no claim to.
HR and payroll software, Web & API penetration test, CRITICAL
A payroll platform held salary, tax and bank details for hundreds of employers. We were asked whether a reporting export could be made to return data the caller was never entitled to.
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