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Citrus ransomware exploits the Certighost AD CS flaw

A new ransomware group, Citrus, chains stolen contractor logins and the Certighost AD CS flaw to seize Windows domains. How it works and what to check.

By Yaali. November 14, 2026, 6 min read, Ransomware, Identity, Threat intel.

Cover illustration of a padlock over a certificate authority building with a ghostly certificate and hidden tunnels, with the Yaamlabs logo and the text: Citrus chains a patched AD CS flaw, CVE-2026-54121

Kaspersky's Securelist team has described a new ransomware group it calls Citrus, which so far hits only Russian companies. The write-up, published on November 11, 2026, is worth reading well outside Russia, because the chain it lays out reuses parts most networks already have: a contractor's stolen login, a domain certificate flaw Microsoft patched in July, and tunnels that hide inside ordinary web traffic.

Citrus gets in with credentials stolen from a contractor, escalates by exploiting CVE-2026-54121, an Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) bug nicknamed Certighost, and finishes by pushing its Sn00py encryptor across the domain through Group Policy. Kaspersky links the group to another Russian-speaking crew tracked as Toy Ghouls, based on shared tools and working directories. The pieces below are what to check on your own network, whoever is pointing them at you.

The Citrus attack chain in four steps, from a stolen contractor login through the Certighost certificate abuse and VLESS tunnels to Sn00py pushed by Group Policy

How it works

Contractor credentials get them in the door

Access starts with an account that does not belong to the target. Citrus logs in with credentials stolen from a contractor's staff, either over the corporate virtual private network (VPN) or against an internet-facing server running Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The contractor account is low-privilege, so on its own it can read a little and change nothing. That is what the next step is for.

Certighost turns a normal account into a domain controller

AD CS is the Windows role that issues the certificates a domain uses to prove identity. Certighost is an improper-authorization flaw in it. The exploit asks the certification authority for a certificate on the built-in Machine template, on behalf of a computer account the attacker just created, and sends forged request data, including a cdc attribute pointing at an attacker-controlled host. The issued certificate ends up carrying a domain controller's name in its Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field. With that certificate, the attacker authenticates to Kerberos as the domain controller account, which is full control of the domain.

Microsoft rates CVE-2026-54121 at CVSS 8.8 and patched it on July 14, 2026. A public proof-of-concept followed on July 24. Any authenticated domain user can run it against an unpatched certification authority, and cleaning up the older ESC1 to ESC8 AD CS misconfigurations does not close this one.

Tunnels that look like HTTPS

To reach back out without standing out, the attackers use certutil, BITS, cURL and PowerShell to fetch Xray, an open-source proxy tool. They then open reverse tunnels using VLESS, a lightweight proxy protocol, to their command-and-control server over port 443, so the traffic sits among normal HTTPS. Its REALITY configuration dresses the connections up as requests to mirror.yandex.ru and yastatic.net, two real Yandex hosts, which makes the flow harder to pick out of web logs.

Sn00py arrives through Group Policy

The final move is a malicious Group Policy Object (GPO). It drops a self-extracting archive, creates a scheduled task that runs it with /quiet /norestart, turns on Windows Remote Management, disables Volume Shadow Copy and Microsoft Defender, and sets the ransom-note wallpaper. The payload is Sn00py, a Go-based encryptor that uses RSA-2048 and ChaCha20 to scramble user files while leaving system files alone, and adds a .citrus extension. Without the attackers' private key there is no decryption. Domain controllers named DC01 to DC04 sit on a host_blacklist so they are spared and keep handing the policy to everything else.

The attackers name their files and policies after Kaspersky, with artefacts such as a GPO called "Kaspersky GPO" and binaries like KasperskyGPO_Deploy_64.exe and KasperskyAgentInstallTask, to look like a routine security rollout. One secondary outlet frames this as the encryptor being disguised as a Kaspersky update; Kaspersky's own report describes it only as the attackers borrowing the vendor's name, and says it is not a flaw in or compromise of Kaspersky software.

What attackers are doing

Kaspersky reports the victims are Russian companies, and both Citrus and Toy Ghouls are Russian-speaking. The timing is the part that travels: the certificate flaw was patched on July 14, a working exploit went public on July 24, and Citrus has been folding it into real intrusions since.

The clearest on-host trace is the account the exploit creates. The public tool names each new machine account GHOST followed by eight random letters, so Securelist saw accounts such as GHOSTAUFTAFGS, GHOSTCZYQVAZS and GHOSTIVPRLDZA appear in victim directories. Alongside the encryptor the group runs mimikatz, PsExec, ADRecon and fscan, which probes ports 135, 139, 1433 and 8006. Kaspersky also found comments in the scripts that read like large language model output, such as # Disable account and # Verify result, and treats that as a likely sign of LLM-assisted scripting rather than confirmed fact.

A defender checklist for Citrus and Certighost: patch the AD CS hosts, enforce MFA on contractor access, enable certificate issuance auditing, hunt for GHOST machine accounts, and watch Group Policy changes

What to do

  1. Patch CVE-2026-54121 on every AD CS host. The flaw affects Windows Server 2012 through 2025 with the AD CS role installed, Server Core included. The July 14, 2026 update is the fix, and there is no configuration-only workaround. 0patch has published micropatches for teams that cannot apply the Microsoft update straight away.
  2. Put MFA on contractor access. Require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) on every contractor VPN and RDP account, and take RDP off the public internet behind the VPN or a gateway.
  3. Turn on certificate issuance auditing. Run certutil -setreg CA\AuditFilter 127 and restart the AD CS service, then enable the "Audit Certification Services" policy so Windows logs event 4886 (request received) and 4887 (certificate issued). Review issued Machine-template certificates whose SAN names a domain controller. Microsoft Defender raises these as "Potential Certighost (CVE-2026-54121) AD CS abuse."
  4. Hunt for the GHOST accounts. Run Get-ADComputer -Filter 'Name -like "GHOST*"' -Properties whenCreated against each domain. Any result is a strong sign of this exploit, and the creation time tells you when to start the rest of the investigation.
  5. Watch Group Policy. Alert on new or changed GPOs, in particular any that create scheduled tasks, disable Defender or Volume Shadow Copy, or carry Kaspersky-styled names you did not set up.

The contractor is part of your attack surface

The quiet way into this whole chain is third-party access. A contractor account with VPN or RDP and no MFA is a domain foothold waiting for one privilege-escalation bug to show up. Give contractors their own scoped accounts, time-box the access to the work, require the same MFA you require of staff, and log their sessions the same way. If a contractor's own security slips, those limits decide how far a stolen password reaches before it hits something it cannot touch.

Our security operations team watches for exactly this sequence, from an out-of-hours contractor login to a freshly minted machine account to a GPO that nobody approved. Our safeguarding and hardening work reviews AD CS templates, certificate auditing and contractor access before an attacker does. Open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to the engineer who would do the work.


Sources: Securelist (Kaspersky) on Citrus ransomware, NVD entry for CVE-2026-54121, 0patch on Certighost micropatches, Ampcus Cyber on the Certighost AD CS flaw, Gridinsoft on Citrus and the fake security deployment.

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