OpenBao OIDC flaw mints identity tokens for anyone
A High-severity bug in OpenBao's OIDC provider lets anyone with a public client ID get a signed identity token. What it does and how to fix it.
By Yaali. November 15, 2026, 6 min read, Vulnerabilities, Identity, Patching.
OpenBao, the open-source secrets manager that many teams run in place of HashiCorp Vault, published a security advisory on November 13 for a flaw in its OpenID Connect provider. OpenID Connect (OIDC) is an identity layer built on top of the OAuth 2.0 authorization protocol, and OpenBao can act as the OIDC provider that logs users in to other applications. The bug, tracked as CVE-2026-126310, lets an unauthenticated caller obtain a signed identity token for a "public" client using nothing but that client's public identifier.
This matters because a secrets manager is supposed to be the trust anchor. If an attacker can make OpenBao issue identity tokens on behalf of a trusted client, they can present those tokens to any application that uses OpenBao for single sign-on. The component meant to hold your most sensitive keys becomes a way to mint identities. The advisory rates it 8.7 on the CVSS version 3.1 scale and 7.0 on the newer version 4.0 scale, both in the High range, and the fix is already shipping.

How it works
An OAuth client is any application that asks an identity provider to authenticate a user. Clients come in two kinds. A confidential client can keep a secret, so it proves who it is with a client ID and a matching client secret. A public client cannot keep a secret, because its code runs where a user can read it: a single-page web app in a browser, or a mobile app on a phone. A public client is identified only by its client ID, which is not a secret and is visible to anyone who uses the app.
OpenBao exposes a token endpoint at identity/oidc/provider/<name>/token. That endpoint supports several OAuth grant types, including client_credentials, a machine-to-machine grant where a client authenticates as itself, with no user involved, and receives a token. The client_credentials grant is meant only for clients that can authenticate, which means confidential clients with a real secret.
The flaw is that OpenBao accepted the client_credentials grant from a client configured as client_type=public. A public client has no secret to check, so the only thing presented is the client ID, which is not confidential. OpenBao did not reject this combination. It issued an OIDC ID token to whoever asked. An ID token is a signed JSON Web Token (JWT), a compact token whose contents are signed so a receiving application can trust them, and it asserts the identity of the authenticated party to that application. The provider should have refused to run the client_credentials grant for a public client, because there is nothing to authenticate. Instead it treated knowledge of the public client ID as proof enough, so any caller who knew the ID received a valid signed token.
The fix makes this explicit. OpenBao now denies client_credentials=true when client_type=public, so the two settings can no longer be combined. The change was committed as part of release 2.7.2 under the note "Ensure client_type=public is denied with client_credentials=true in the OIDC provider."
Why this is serious
The danger depends on what those ID tokens are accepted for. If an application trusts OpenBao as its OIDC provider and keys access off the identity in the token, an attacker holding a forged-but-validly-signed token can sign in as that client's principal. The token is signed by OpenBao's real key, so it passes signature checks at the relying application. Nothing looks wrong from the outside.
Public clients are common. Any single-page app or mobile app that authenticates through OpenBao is a public client by design, and its client ID is already exposed in the application itself. That means the attacker does not need to breach anything to learn the input they need. The client ID is the kind of value that shows up in page source, network traces and mobile app bundles.
OpenBao is a fork of HashiCorp Vault, and the OIDC provider feature exists in Vault too. This advisory is specific to OpenBao's implementation and its fixed releases, so do not assume a Vault deployment is affected or unaffected without checking HashiCorp's own advisories. The point that applies everywhere is narrower: a system that brokers secrets and identities has to authenticate the party asking for a token, and a public client by definition cannot be authenticated by a grant designed for confidential clients.
What to do
Upgrade OpenBao to a fixed release. The flaw affects every version before 2.6.5, and the 2.7.x line from 2.7.0 up to but not including 2.7.2. The fixes are 2.6.5 and 2.7.2, and 2.7.2 shipped on October 26. The 2.6 series is no longer supported upstream, so if you are on 2.6.x the recommended path is to move to the 2.7 line rather than stay on 2.6.5.
If you cannot upgrade immediately, change the client configuration instead. On every client of client_type=public, set client_credentials=false, and never configure a client with both client_type=public and client_credentials=true. That combination is exactly what the flaw depends on, and removing it closes the hole without the upgrade. Confirm the setting on each public client rather than assuming the default.
Review which applications trust OpenBao's OIDC provider and what their ID tokens actually grant. For each relying application, note whether it treats a validly signed token as sufficient to act as the client, and whether it checks anything else. Where you have the choice, prefer confidential clients with a real client secret and proper client authentication, and use Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE), the OAuth extension that binds an authorization request to the client that started it, for the public clients that have to stay public.
Audit token issuance on the provider. Look through OpenBao's audit log for calls to the identity/oidc/provider/<name>/token endpoint that used the client_credentials grant against a public client, especially from callers or source addresses you do not recognise, and for issuance that does not line up with a real user sign-in. OpenBao's audit log records request paths and metadata, so filtering on that endpoint and grant type is the fastest way to see whether anyone exercised this before you patched. If you find issuance you cannot account for, treat the affected client's trust as suspect and review what its tokens could reach.
This is the same failure we look for in a red team and code review engagement: an authentication path that accepts a public identifier as if it were a secret, and a grant type applied to a client that cannot satisfy it. Getting OIDC client types and grants configured so they fail closed is part of safeguarding and hardening the systems that broker identity. If you run OpenBao or Vault and want a second pair of eyes on which clients are public and what their tokens unlock, open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to the engineer who would do the work.
Sources: OpenBao advisory GHSA-q824-44ff-f5j5, CVE-2026-126310 on osv.dev, CVE-2026-126310 record, OpenBao 2.7.2 release notes, OpenBao Advisory Watch newsletter.
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