Bug bounty roundup: 10 disclosed reports worth reading
Ten HackerOne reports from 21 Oct to 13 Nov 2026: a Basecamp takeover XSS, a Shopify auth bypass, a WordPress media-race RCE and more.
By Yaali. November 14, 2026, 10 min read, Bug bounty, Vulnerabilities.
This roundup collects ten bug bounty reports that HackerOne programs disclosed publicly between 21 October and 13 November 2026. Researchers found the bugs, the programs fixed them, and each write-up is linked to the original report and credited to the person who reported it. Where a report carries one, the CVSS numbers are the Common Vulnerability Scoring System ratings the archives record. Three of the ten paid a bounty: 3,100 US dollars from Shopify, 1,026 from Vercel and 1,000 from PortSwigger, which is 5,126 dollars across the set.
One pattern repeats: a check that guards one thing while the code trusts another. Shopify's edge rule matched the text of a URL, so the same page at a second URL skipped it. Nextcloud confirmed an available slot existed near the requested time, then saved the requested time. Vercel's revocation held until unrelated activity revived a dead token. Burp validated one OpenAPI object and acted on another. The rest are trusted input reaching a dangerous place, or a library default undoing a chosen setting.

Stored XSS to account takeover: a Basecamp attachment
matty69v showed that an outside collaborator on one Basecamp project can make themselves a full account administrator. The collaborator posts a message that renders as an ordinary YouTube embed but hides attacker HTML in the embed's content attribute. When an admin opens that message in the editor, Lexxy reparses the markup, an invalid select-option-div sequence becomes a live element, and a surviving data-behavior attribute fetches attacker HTML and writes it with innerHTML. That inserts a cross-origin Turbo frame, and Turbo copies the page's content security policy nonce onto its script, so cross-site scripting (XSS, running attacker JavaScript inside a trusted origin) fires on app.basecamp.com. The script reads the admin's cross-site request forgery (CSRF) token and calls the administrator-grant endpoint. The fix rebuilds attachment markup server-side, blocks data attributes, and stops applying the page nonce to attacker frames. Program: Basecamp. Severity: high (CVSS 8.7). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: matty69v. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4175245
Missing authentication: Shopify staff pages behind a framework rewrite
cafecito found that the Checkout Blocks app protected its /internal staff pages with an edge rule that redirects anonymous requests to employee login. The rule matches the start of the URL. The app runs on Next.js, which serves every page at a second address too, /_next/data/<buildId>/<route>.json, and that path does not begin with /internal, so the rule ignores it and the same handler answers 200 with JSON to a request that carries no cookie. The build id needed to form that URL is printed in the public /login page. The staff endpoint returned the merchant install list, which the server reported as 201,520 records across 40,304 pages, each with the shop domain, an internal id, the install date and internal flags, including non-public staging stores. The fix checks the session in the route's own code, as /api/admin on the same server already does. Program: Shopify. Severity: medium. Bounty: 3,100 US dollars. Reporter: cafecito. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3954327
Author to remote code execution: a WordPress 7.1 media race
mappymappy123 reported a race in the WordPress 7.1 development line that lets a default Author write a persistent PHP file and reach remote code execution (RCE, running attacker commands on the server). A finalize call points the attachment's original-image path at an attacker-chosen temporary .php name. A second media call with a url parameter makes WordPress fetch an attacker JPEG whose remote Content-Disposition header forces that .php basename, so a valid image briefly exists with an executable extension. Racing the post-process call against that window has Imagick open the file as an image and write persistent .php derivatives, with PHP code hidden in the image's metadata. Those derivatives can be requested over HTTP with no login and run as the web-server user. It was reported before 7.1 shipped, does not affect 7.0, and needs a PHP-served writable temporary directory, which happens when /tmp is unwritable and WordPress falls back to wp-content. The fix validates the finalize metadata and refuses executable extensions. Program: WordPress. Severity: high. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: mappymappy123. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3923967
Local file read: Burp's OpenAPI import follows a crafted schema
1rhino2 found that Burp Community's "Save OpenAPI requests to site map" action can read a local file. The validator and the click handler select different objects from the same response: a nested OpenAPI 3.0 block makes the menu item appear, but the handler parses the top-level OpenAPI 3.1 object. In 3.1, a local file URL in the $id field becomes the base for a fragment-only reference. Burp rejects a direct file reference as external, but the $id-plus-fragment form passes that check, so Burp opens the local JSON schema and copies its example value into the generated request body. The read happens on the machine running Burp when the user invokes the action; the value only leaves the host if the user later sends that request. Local schema files can hold internal endpoint examples, sample credentials or tenant identifiers. The researcher rated it medium under the program's reduced-interaction category. Program: PortSwigger. Severity: medium. Bounty: 1,000 US dollars. Reporter: 1rhino2. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4000535
Broken access control: a revoked Vercel collaborator gets back in
qub reported that a removed deployment collaborator can return to private data on vercel.live. After revocation the collaborator's token correctly returns 403 Forbidden on the sync endpoint, /api/replicache/pull. The problem appears when a different, active collaborator interacts with the deployment comment toolbar: that unrelated activity re-authorizes the revoked token, which can then pull the full comment threads, messages and activity for the deployment. The removed user is never re-invited and no new token is issued, so revocation becomes advisory until the next active interaction wakes the old credential. The researcher demonstrated the 403, the active collaborator's comment, and the same stale token returning 200 with the private data. The fix checks revocation on every authenticated request, invalidates the token at removal, and stops the sync layer from restoring permissions from cached membership. Program: Vercel. Severity: medium (CVSS 4.8). Bounty: 1,026 US dollars. Reporter: qub. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3852102
Hostname validation bypass: a NUL byte splits what Node.js resolves
hasanfleyah showed the June 2026 fix for CVE-2026-48930 was incomplete. That fix rejected embedded NUL bytes at dns.lookup, but not at the dns.resolve family, which feeds the c-ares binding. On the patched Node v26.9.0, passing attacker.test, a NUL byte, then .trusted.corp to dns.resolve4 did not throw, and the name that left the process on the wire was just attacker.test. So the name a program checks in JavaScript and the name Node queries can differ, now tracked as CVE-2026-105482. This matters for code that validates a hostname and then resolves it, such as a server-side request forgery (SSRF, tricking the server into contacting attacker-chosen hosts) allowlist, a domain name system (DNS) rebinding guard, or a TXT-record check: the guard approves the padded name, Node resolves the shorter one, and the lookup succeeds rather than fails, so nothing reveals the swap. The fix rejects NUL bytes at the dns.resolve entry points too. Program: Node.js. Severity: high (CVSS 7.4). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: hasanfleyah. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4038342
Information disclosure: thousands of emails behind author pages
matty69v also reported mass data exposure on a WordPress loyalty site run by Essity. The site had 123,109 enumerable users, reachable one at a time with the /?author=N query, and in a 250-user sample 98.4 percent carried their full email address as their WordPress display name. That name leaks through the author archive page title, the REST user listing at /wp-json/wp/v2/users and the author RSS feeds, none of which required authentication. Sequential ids let the whole set be walked with no rate limiting, and the author pages had no noindex and no robots.txt block, so search engines could index the addresses too. The researcher estimated about 121,000 exposed consumer emails, a ready-made list for phishing and credential stuffing. Personally identifiable information like this, data that identifies a person (PII), carries breach-notification duties under European data law. The fix anonymizes display names, adds noindex and a robots.txt disallow, requires authentication on the user listing, and rate-limits the query. Program: Essity. Severity: critical. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: matty69v. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3840113
SQL injection: a MariaDB driver trusts a savepoint name
fg0x0 found two defects in the MariaDB Connector/C++ driver that combine into arbitrary statement execution. The connection code computes a capability mask that honors the allowMultiQueries option, then discards it and passes a hardcoded multi-statement flag to the connect call, so stacked statements work on every connection even though the option defaults to off. Separately, the savepoint methods concatenate the application-supplied savepoint name into SQL (structured query language) with no quoting. A savepoint name such as "sp; CREATE TABLE ...; -- " therefore runs that trailing statement, and the researcher created a table purely through a savepoint name while allowMultiQueries was explicitly false. The always-on flag is the amplifier: it turns any injection in or above the driver from single-statement into arbitrary stacked statements, and an application that disabled multi-query cannot tell the setting does nothing. The fix passes the computed mask and quotes the identifier. Program: MariaDB. Severity: medium (CVSS 6.9). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: fg0x0. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3890329
Open redirect: one str_replace hands off a wordpress.org link
jakubk reported an open redirect under wordpress.org/openverse that defeats the WordPress.org single sign-on allowlist. The Openverse theme builds its redirect target by stripping the /openverse prefix from the request path and appending the remainder to a bare origin. The strip uses str_replace with a fourth argument of 1, but that argument is a count output, not a limit, so every occurrence of /openverse is removed rather than the first. A path of /openverse/openverse@evil.example/ collapses to @evil.example/, and appended to https://openverse.wordpress.net with no trailing slash it becomes a URL whose authority is evil.example. The target goes to wp_redirect, which runs no allowlist check. Because the link's own hostname is literally wordpress.org, it passes the single sign-on (SSO) allowlist that limits post-login targets to four trusted domains, so login.wordpress.org becomes a launcher onto attacker content. The fix strips the prefix as a prefix and uses the safe redirect helper. Program: WordPress. Severity: medium (CVSS 6.1). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: jakubk. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3933198
Business logic: booking a Nextcloud calendar at any time
0xh3llo reported a logic flaw in Nextcloud's public appointment booking. The endpoint confirms that some bookable slot exists inside the start and end window the requester sends, then saves the requester's raw start and end rather than the matched slot. The window search scans roughly 24 hours around the requested start, so any day with configured availability within about a day of the request satisfies the check. An unauthenticated attacker who holds the public booking link can therefore create a confirmed event in the organizer's real calendar at a time never offered, including outside working hours and dated in the past. The same shortcut skips the daily-maximum and conflict checks, because those also measure the candidate slot and not the stored value, so an event can land on top of an existing private appointment. The fix requires the requested time to match one returned slot exactly and persists the slot's own values. Program: Nextcloud. Severity: low (CVSS 3.7). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: 0xh3llo. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3943436
What ties the set together
A guard is only as good as the value it reads. Shopify matched a URL string and missed the framework's second route; Nextcloud checked a search window and saved an unchecked time; Vercel checked revocation once and let later activity revive the token. When you write an authorization or validation check, confirm it runs on the exact value that reaches the sink, on every path that reaches it. The MariaDB driver default and the Node.js NUL truncation are the sort source review catches: a library that quietly supplies a capability the operator switched off, or a fix that landed on one entry point and skipped its siblings.
Our web application penetration testing exercises signup, redirect, caching and authorization flows like the Basecamp, Shopify, Vercel and Nextcloud reports, and red team code review reads source for the incomplete fixes, unsafe defaults and missing bounds behind the Node.js, MariaDB and WordPress bugs. Open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to an engineer.
Sources: Individual reports on HackerOne: https://hackerone.com/reports/4175245, https://hackerone.com/reports/3954327, https://hackerone.com/reports/3923967, https://hackerone.com/reports/4000535, https://hackerone.com/reports/3852102, https://hackerone.com/reports/4038342, https://hackerone.com/reports/3840113, https://hackerone.com/reports/3890329, https://hackerone.com/reports/3933198, https://hackerone.com/reports/3943436. Archives used for ranking and detail: https://github.com/ajaysenr/HackerOne-Disclosed-Reports and https://github.com/Gh0stSpy/HackerOne-Disclosed-Reports-Database </content>
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- Bug bounty roundup: 10 disclosed reports worth reading
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