Bug bounty roundup: 10 disclosed reports worth reading
Ten HackerOne reports from 20 Sep to 14 Oct 2026: two use-after-free RCEs in curl and MariaDB, a CONNECT file-read bypass, a wolfSSL pin bypass and more.
By Yaali. November 15, 2026, 9 min read, Bug bounty, Vulnerabilities.
This roundup collects ten bug bounty reports that HackerOne programs disclosed publicly between 20 September and 14 October 2026. This edition reaches back over several weeks rather than a single day, because earlier roundups have already used almost every report disclosed in the last two days that carries a full write-up. Researchers found the bugs, the programs fixed them, and every section links the original report and credits the reporter. Where a report records one, the CVSS figures are the Common Vulnerability Scoring System ratings the archives hold. One of the ten paid a disclosed bounty, 200 US dollars from HackerOne.
Two themes run through the set. The first is memory safety in C and C++: a use-after-free in curl's HTTP/2 upload path and another in MariaDB's cursor code, both driven to remote code execution, plus a pre-authentication integer underflow that crashes a MariaDB server with one packet. The second is a check that reads a different value than the one reaching the dangerous operation: a privilege gate wired to a storage engine's tables but not its helper functions, two certificate parsers that disagree on the same bytes, and a status filter never told to exclude private posts.

Use-after-free to RCE: a MariaDB cursor array that moves mid-call
akkoul found a heap use-after-free (UAF, code that keeps using memory after it is freed) on the MariaDB 13.x line. Opening a cursor passes the addresses of result objects that sit inside a resizable array of cursors. If that cursor's query runs a function declaring a seventeenth cursor, the array outgrows its sixteen slots and reallocates, freeing the old buffer and leaving those addresses dangling. On return MariaDB makes a virtual call through the dangling pointer, which hands an attacker instruction-pointer control and so remote code execution (RCE, running attacker code on the server). Any account with CREATE FUNCTION can reach it, common on shared hosting. Program: MariaDB. Severity: high (CVSS 8.8). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: akkoul. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3915935
Privilege bypass: MariaDB CONNECT file functions skip their own gate
duongtt showed that the CONNECT engine's file functions read and write server files without checking the FILE privilege or the secure_file_priv directory limit, the two controls that normally confine file access from SQL. They are user-defined functions (UDFs, custom SQL functions loaded into the server) such as json_file and jfile_make. The same engine enforces both checks on its file-backed tables, so only the function entry points were left open. A user with only SELECT can read any file the server can open, including TLS private keys, and write JSON as the mysql system user outside secure_file_priv. It was reproduced on MariaDB 12.3.2 GA. The fix extends the table-path checks to the functions. Program: MariaDB. Severity: high (CVSS 8.8). CVE: CVE-2024-27766. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: duongtt. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3836021
Use-after-free to RCE: curl replays an upload as a new request
onn4a reported that curl 8.22.0 mishandles an HTTP/2 stream reset during a file upload. A server RST_STREAM carrying HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED or REFUSED_STREAM makes curl retry: it first tells the connection to forget the transfer, then flushes the buffered, unsent remainder of the upload body into that same connection. Not knowing the transfer any more, curl reads those bytes as a new request, and if a line parses as a request line it opens a stream holding a pointer to the transfer handle. The handle is freed after the retry, but the connection keeps the pointer and dereferences it when the server sends a later frame, for example at pool shutdown. That use-after-free reached code execution on the uploading client. It needs an upload above roughly 135 kilobytes containing a request-line-shaped line. Program: curl. Severity: high. CVE: CVE-2026-92392. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: onn4a. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4030333
Integer underflow: an empty password packet crashes MariaDB
vnth4nhnt found a pre-authentication crash in the caching_sha2_password plugin. Over a plaintext connection it decrypts the client reply with the server RSA key, sets a length from the decrypted size with no empty-result check, then calls the hashing routine with that length minus one. The length argument is an unsigned size_t. An attacker encrypts an empty message with RSA-OAEP, the plugin's padding scheme, so the decrypted length is zero and length minus one underflows to SIZE_MAX. The routine then reads SIZE_MAX bytes from a small stack buffer, an out-of-bounds read that drops the whole server. It fires before any credential check, so one unauthenticated connection downs the instance for every client. It affects MySQL-compatible setups using caching_sha2_password without enforced TLS. Program: MariaDB. Severity: medium (CVSS 5.7). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: vnth4nhnt. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3781201
Certificate pinning bypass: two parsers, two different keys
argareksapatii showed that curl 8.22.0 built with wolfSSL can accept a pinned public key the server never holds. wolfSSL completes the handshake with key A from a malformed certificate, then curl reparses the same DER, the binary certificate encoding, with its own routine, and a doctored length on the validity field shifts the parse so curl selects a different embedded key, key B. The server proves it holds A, but curl checks the pin against B and, if B matches, accepts the connection and sends the request. So the certificate the handshake authenticated and the key the pin verified are not the same object. This defeats public-key pinning even in pinning-only mode, where the pin is the sole trust anchor. The fix aligns curl's parser with the backend. Program: curl. Severity: medium. CVE: CVE-2026-87866. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: argareksapatii. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3989514
SSRF: a Nextcloud push device points the server where it likes
yoyomiski reported that a low-privilege Nextcloud user can register a push device and set its proxy address to anything, because the registration route needs no admin rights and never validates the proxyServer value. When a notification later fires for that user, the server sends an outbound request to the chosen address. That is server-side request forgery (SSRF, making the server issue requests to targets the attacker picks), and the demonstration aimed it at localhost to reach services bound to the loopback interface. The researcher registered the device over the API, triggered a test push, and confirmed the backend request in the log, sourced from 127.0.0.1. The fix validates and restricts the proxy destination. Program: Nextcloud. Severity: medium (CVSS 5.4). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: yoyomiski. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3623149
HTML injection: a name field becomes a phishing link in a trusted email
tenzai found that an Essity contact form drops the submitted first name into the confirmation email with no HTML entity encoding, so the greeting renders attacker markup. Script and image tags are stripped, but a styled anchor tag survives, which is enough to plant a clickable link. An attacker sets the first name to a bold link and names any recipient, who then gets a genuine Essity-branded email from Essity's own SendGrid service, passing the SPF, DKIM and DMARC email-authentication checks. SendGrid rewrites the link through its click tracker but still forwards the click to the attacker. The endpoint has no authentication, CAPTCHA or rate limiting, so the abuse scales. The fix encodes name fields and adds a challenge and rate limits. Program: Essity. Severity: medium (CVSS 5.3). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: tenzai. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3802451
Broken access control: WordPress hands out private post titles
jakubk reported that Secure Custom Fields, the WordPress.org fork of Advanced Custom Fields, registers unauthenticated query handlers for three field types. Those handlers run a query whose post status defaults to any with no capability check, so they return draft, pending, private and scheduled posts. The only guard is a per-field nonce, a single-use token, but when the field appears on a public front-end form that nonce is printed into the page, and WordPress nonces for logged-out visitors are shared across every anonymous user. So an attacker scrapes the token and calls the handler to list the titles and identifiers of non-public posts, and can search for a specific one with the search parameter. The fix constrains the status and adds a capability check. Program: WordPress. Severity: medium (CVSS 5.3). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: jakubk. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3893632
Credential exposure: a reset token sent to analytics on page load
1rhino2 found that opening a HackerOne Code password-reset link sends the full 64-character reset token to Segment, a third-party analytics pipeline, as the page loads and before the form is submitted. The client fires the analytics page event without stripping the secret query value, so the live token lands in the event's URL and search fields. In a returning browser that event shares an anonymous identifier Segment already ties to the account email and user id, so anyone with timely read access to the telemetry could join the token to the account and set a new password while it is still valid. It is rated low because exploitation needs that access inside the token's short lifetime. The fix removes secret query values before analytics calls. Program: HackerOne. Severity: low. Bounty: 200 US dollars. Reporter: 1rhino2. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4000185
Input validation: a Nextcloud emoji field jams the sidebar
yoyomiski also reported that the page-emoji endpoint in the Nextcloud Collectives app does not validate what it stores. A user with edit rights on a shared page can send a long string with line breaks in place of a single emoji. The sidebar renders that string as the page icon, the oversized icon overlaps neighbouring entries, and other pages in the collective can no longer be clicked. It is a user-interface denial of service (DoS, making a feature unusable), limited to people who view that collective's sidebar, which is why it sits at the low end. The lesson is general: a field meant for one emoji should be checked to hold one emoji, with a length cap and no newlines, before it is saved. Program: Nextcloud. Severity: low (CVSS 3.1). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: yoyomiski. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3599470
What ties the set together
The memory-safety bugs in curl and MariaDB are the kind source review catches: a pointer held across a reallocation, a buffered body replayed after its owner is freed, a length that underflows because nothing rejects zero. The rest guard the wrong value. CONNECT's functions skip the gate the same engine enforces on its tables, curl pins a key a second parser chose, and Secure Custom Fields returns posts a status filter was never told to exclude. When you write an authorization or validation check, confirm it runs on the exact value that reaches the sink, on every path there, and bound every length before you subtract from it or read with it.
Our web application penetration testing exercises the redirect, caching, email and authorization flows behind the Nextcloud, Essity, WordPress and HackerOne reports, and red team code review reads source for the unsafe defaults and missing bounds behind the curl and MariaDB bugs. Open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to an engineer.
Sources: Individual reports on HackerOne: https://hackerone.com/reports/3915935, https://hackerone.com/reports/3836021, https://hackerone.com/reports/4030333, https://hackerone.com/reports/3781201, https://hackerone.com/reports/3989514, https://hackerone.com/reports/3623149, https://hackerone.com/reports/3802451, https://hackerone.com/reports/3893632, https://hackerone.com/reports/4000185, https://hackerone.com/reports/3599470. Archives used for ranking and detail: https://github.com/ajaysenr/HackerOne-Disclosed-Reports and https://github.com/Gh0stSpy/HackerOne-Disclosed-Reports-Database </content>
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- Bug bounty roundup: 10 disclosed reports worth reading
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