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Bug bounty roundup: 10 disclosed reports worth reading

Ten HackerOne reports from 10 Oct to 15 Nov 2026: a $10,000 Arc RPC outage, a critical Weblate privilege escalation, plus curl and MariaDB memory bugs.

By Yaali. November 16, 2026, 10 min read, Bug bounty, Vulnerabilities.

Cover illustration of a magnifying glass over stacked vulnerability report cards, with the Yaamlabs logo and the text: Ten more disclosed reports worth reading, $10,000, top bounty this week

This roundup collects ten bug bounty reports that HackerOne programs disclosed publicly between 10 October and 15 November 2026. The freshest four went public on 15 November; the rest reach back to mid-October, because earlier roundups have already used almost every report with a full write-up disclosed in the days between. Other researchers found these bugs and the programs fixed them, so every section links the original report and credits the reporter by their handle. Where a report records one, the CVSS figures are the Common Vulnerability Scoring System ratings the source archives hold. One of the ten carries a disclosed bounty: 10,000 US dollars from Arc, Circle's blockchain network, for a denial-of-service (DoS, making a service unavailable) bug that drops its public nodes with a single request.

Two threads run through the set. Several are a check reading the wrong value: Weblate restores a backup without the filter the live interface enforces, bbPress reads a subforum's status but not its private parent's, and a Weblate throttle trusts a header the client sets. The rest are bounds nobody set: an Arc node runs attacker JavaScript with no timeout or memory cap, a MariaDB connector trusts a length a hostile server reports, a geometry parser recurses with no depth limit, and curl walks past a buffer after its transport over-reports how much it sent.

Ten disclosed reports ranked by severity: Weblate privilege escalation via backup import critical 9.9, Arc RPC unauthenticated denial of service high with a 10,000 dollar bounty, MariaDB Connector C++ out-of-bounds read medium 4.6, MariaDB geometry parser recursion denial of service medium, WordPress bbPress private content leak medium, Weblate API rate-limit bypass medium, curl WebSocket memory over-read low, curl Negotiate cross-origin reuse low, Weblate anonymous suggestion IP exposure low, Remitly password reset accepts old password informational

Privilege escalation: a Weblate backup restores a role it should refuse

zukosdead showed that importing a project backup into Weblate, the open-source translation platform, restores its access-control teams without re-checking the roles they reference. The web interface and the application programming interface (API) both refuse to attach a site-wide role to a project-scoped team; the backup restore path skips that filter. A low-privilege user who can import a backup edits the backup JSON to add a team that names their own account and a privileged role already present on the target, then imports the zip through the normal flow. A second flaw compounds it: Weblate reads a user's site-wide permissions from team memberships without excluding teams tied to one project, so a global role applies everywhere. The attacker ends up able to create projects across the instance, and where a custom "Manage users" role exists, to promote themselves to administrator. The fix restores the role filter and excludes project-scoped teams from global permissions. Program: Weblate. Severity: critical (CVSS 9.9). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: zukosdead. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4081135

Unauthenticated DoS: an Arc RPC node runs whatever JavaScript you send

cantina-security found that Arc's public remote procedure call (RPC, the interface clients use to query a node) endpoints expose go-ethereum-style custom JavaScript tracers through debug_traceCall and debug_traceTransaction with no authentication, timeout, memory cap or result-size cap. The submitted code runs inside the node in Boa, a pure-Rust JavaScript engine, and several single unauthenticated requests end the worker process or starve it. About 150 nested parentheses overflow the parser's unguarded stack; a Map iterator paired with a garbage-collection bug aborts the whole process in under a tenth of a second; the regex engine has no backtracking limit, so one request pins a worker thread for seconds or hours of the attacker's choosing; and a native array-to-hex helper iterates an attacker-set length, costing about 137 seconds of processor time and over 12 gigabytes of memory per request. The node's only guards, a 200,000 loop-iteration and 10,000 recursion limit, count JavaScript work alone, so native work slips past them, and because both endpoints reflect any origin with credentials, a web page can fire these from a visitor's browser. The engine is memory-safe Rust, so the ceiling is a repeatable outage rather than code execution. The complete short-term fix is to drop string tracers from the public endpoint and put the debug methods behind authentication. Program: Arc. Severity: high. Bounty: 10,000 US dollars. Reporter: cantina-security. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3966160

Out-of-bounds read: a MariaDB connector trusts a lying server

fg0x0 reported that MariaDB Connector/C++ sizes each result-column buffer to the column length the server declared at prepare time, then reads the field length the server reports in each row out of that same buffer. The underlying libmariadb copies only as many bytes as the buffer holds but still reports the server's full length, and the C++ layer never clamps the two. A malicious or intercepting server that declares a four-byte column and sends a 40,000-byte field drives a heap out-of-bounds (OOB, reading past the end of an allocation) read: the connector hands the application the four real bytes followed by whatever sat next in the process heap, and a large enough length crashes the client. Any server-side prepared statement or stored-procedure call reaches it, and in a connection-pooled service the leaked heap can hold other users' data or pointers useful for defeating address randomisation. The fix reads no more than the buffer holds. Program: MariaDB. Severity: medium (CVSS 4.6). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: fg0x0. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3872248

Recursion DoS: a nested geometry value overflows MariaDB's stack

tsg1696 found that MariaDB's spatial parser recurses once per nested child when reading a well-known binary (WKB, the binary encoding for geometry) GEOMETRYCOLLECTION, with no depth limit and no stack-overrun check, though MariaDB guards recursion almost everywhere else. A single value a few thousand levels deep exhausts the thread stack and crashes the whole server, dropping every connection. On a test build with a roughly 292 kilobyte stack, 50 levels parsed cleanly while 120,000 produced a segmentation fault. The same gap sits behind the text and GeoJSON parsers, and behind inserting a crafted value into a geometry column, so any account that can call a spatial function can trigger it. The fix is the standard stack-overrun check, or a hard cap on nesting depth. Program: MariaDB. Severity: medium (reporter-estimated CVSS about 6.5). Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: tsg1696. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3896507

Broken access control: bbPress leaks a private forum to a public feed

thewindghost showed that bbPress, a WordPress forum plugin, decides whether to hide new topic or reply activity from the status of the posting forum alone, not its parents. A subforum left public but nested under a private parent therefore has its topics pushed in full, title, link and raw body, into the public activity stream BuddyPress exposes, even though the topic's own page returns a 404 to the same viewer. The researcher posted in such a subforum, confirmed the direct link was blocked, then read the content anonymously from the BuddyPress activity API. The one-line fix checks the forum's ancestors instead of the forum alone. Program: WordPress (bbPress Core). Severity: medium. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: thewindghost. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4053546

Rate-limit bypass: a spoofed header hands out fresh Weblate quotas

hexa34 found that Weblate's anonymous API rate limiting can be sidestepped by changing the X-Forwarded-For header. The throttle inherits Django REST Framework's (DRF, the toolkit Weblate's API uses) default client identification instead of Weblate's own normalised client address, so the per-client bucket ends up keyed on a header the client controls. Rotating that value yields a fresh bucket each time, which the reporter confirmed by reading the cache keys directly rather than inferring it from response codes. An unauthenticated client can then spread traffic across unlimited buckets and run well past the limit, which eases scraping and enumeration of the anonymous endpoints. The fix keys the throttle on the server-side remote address the proxy middleware already computes. Program: Weblate. Severity: medium. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: hexa34. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4059744

Memory over-read: curl leaks client memory during a WebSocket upload

onn4a reported that curl 8.22.0 built with GnuTLS can send memory past its WebSocket buffer while uploading to a wss:// server. Its GnuTLS send routine never handles the library reporting more bytes written than it was given. After a blocked send, GnuTLS holds an encrypted 16,384-byte record and later returns that length for whatever shorter buffer the next call passes. If the server sends a keepalive mid-upload, curl's ten-byte reply is flushed first; GnuTLS answers for the held record, curl advances 16,384 bytes past the ten-byte buffer, the remaining count underflows, and the loop keeps sending the memory that follows. The server chooses how far to read, and reaching the end of the heap crashes the client. It needs an upload of a few megabytes, and GnuTLS builds are the default on Debian and Ubuntu. The fix treats the oversized return as an error, not a debug-only assertion. Program: curl. Severity: low. CVE: CVE-2026-107928. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: onn4a. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4099194

Authentication reuse: curl sends a Kerberos session to the wrong host

hadd0ck found that curl, after a rewrite of its connection-reuse logic, can send a request for one host over a connection already authenticated with Negotiate, the Kerberos single sign-on (SSO) mechanism, for a different host, while the new request's own credentials go unused. The rewrite replaced a branch that reused a connection only when idle with an early return that checks whether the connection stores credentials. In the ordinary Kerberos case curl runs from the ticket cache and stores none, so that check never fires and the origin comparison that would catch the mismatch is skipped. When both hosts sit behind one forwarding proxy, which pools them together, a later request made with --anyauth can ride the connection authenticated for the first host, and the second host then sees the caller's identity on the first. The fix restores the origin check. Program: curl. Severity: low. CVE: CVE-2026-87861. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: hadd0ck. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3972094

Information disclosure: a Weblate reader sees contributors' IP addresses

4upasta found that the IP address stored with an anonymous translation suggestion is returned by Weblate's Change API to any authenticated user with read-only project access, even though the regular change-history page hides it from that same account. In a local test, a reader with project visibility but no edit rights fetched the changes API and received the address in the details field, while the HTML page for that account did not contain it. The mismatch is a serializer handing out a field the web view deliberately withholds. The lesson generalises: the API and the interface have to agree on what each role may see, because a field redacted in one and served by the other is still disclosed. The reporter confirmed it against local source, not a live deployment. Program: Weblate. Severity: low. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: 4upasta. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/4117330

Weak reset policy: Remitly accepts your current password as the new one

is_kareem2004 reported that Remitly's password reset flow accepts the account's current password as the new one, with no rejection, so a reset can leave the credential unchanged. On its own this is a hygiene gap, which is why it sits last, but it matters right after a suspected session takeover: a user who resets to the same password has not rotated the secret an attacker may already hold, while believing they have. The fix rejects a new password equal to the current one in the reset and change flows. Program: Remitly. Severity: informational. Bounty: not disclosed. Reporter: is_kareem2004. Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/3189580

What ties the set together

Half of these are one mistake in different clothes: a decision made against the wrong value. When you write an authorization or validation check, confirm it runs on the exact value that reaches the sensitive step, on every path there, and that the API and the interface agree on what each role may see. The rest are bounds nobody set. Put a limit on every input you did not generate, and treat anything a remote peer tells you about a size as a claim to check, not a fact.

Our web application penetration testing exercises the authorization, rate-limit, API and reset flows behind the Weblate, bbPress and Remitly findings, and red team code review reads source for the missing bounds and unsafe defaults behind the Arc, curl and MariaDB bugs. Open the chat and Yaali, our AI agent, will pass your question to an engineer.


Sources: Individual reports on HackerOne: https://hackerone.com/reports/4081135, https://hackerone.com/reports/3966160, https://hackerone.com/reports/3872248, https://hackerone.com/reports/3896507, https://hackerone.com/reports/4053546, https://hackerone.com/reports/4059744, https://hackerone.com/reports/4099194, https://hackerone.com/reports/3972094, https://hackerone.com/reports/4117330, https://hackerone.com/reports/3189580. Archives used for ranking and detail: https://github.com/ajaysenr/HackerOne-Disclosed-Reports and https://github.com/Gh0stSpy/HackerOne-Disclosed-Reports-Database

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